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MAKING A REASONABLE CALCULATION: A STRATEGIC
AMENDMENT TO THE IDEA
Hetali Lodaya*

ABSTRACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) lays out a powerful set of
protections and procedural safeguards for students with disabilities in public schools.
Nevertheless, there is a persistent debate as to how far schools must go to fulfill their
mandate under the IDEA. The Supreme Court recently addressed this question with its
decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. School District Re-1, holding that an
educational program for a student with a disability must be “reasonably calculated” to
enable a child’s progress in light of their circumstances. Currently, the Act’s statutory
language mandates Individual Education Program (IEP) teams to consider a variety of
factors including “the strengths of each child,” “the concerns of the parents,” “the
results of the . . . most recent evaluation of the child,” and “the academic,
1
developmental, and functional needs of the child.” This Note proposes an amendment
to the IDEA, inspired by the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
(SWOT) analysis framework used in business strategy, that adds external “threats” to
this list of factors. This amendment will help parents, advocates, and schools better
understand the Endrew F. standard and implement it with fidelity to the IDEA’s
broad mandate.
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INTRODUCTION
How does a school, charged with the education of potentially
hundreds or thousands of students, keep track of students with
disabilities and make sure they are getting the services they need to
succeed? What, in fact, does it mean for them to succeed? Congress
attempted to address the first question when it passed what is now
known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, outlining
a robust framework for providing support and services to students
2
with disabilities in K-12 public schools. The second question was
most recently taken up by the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1; the Court held that an educational program
for a student with a disability cannot simply provide a de minimis
benefit, but must instead be “reasonably calculated to enable a
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circum-

2.

See infra Part I.
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stances.” 3 While advocates seem to generally agree that this statement represents a positive raising of the standard of education to
be provided under the Act, there has been very little change in
outcomes in the lower courts when adjudicating special education
4
disputes. By extension, it is unclear if there has been a significant
change at the school level in terms of how on-the-ground administrators and personnel responsible for creating each student’s IEP
5
approach this process.
The IDEA is framed prospectively: members of a student’s IEP
team must use what they know about the child, along with their
own expertise and the wishes of the parents, to set goals for the
6
upcoming year and identify strategies to reach them. Children do
not learn in a vacuum, however—their learning takes places in a
broader school environment. This environment inevitably brings
with it a variety of potential complications that can affect the viability of a plan developed in a conference room. Conspicuously missing from the current IEP framework is an explicit consideration of
potential external threats to a child’s ability to progress through
their IEP goals. This deficiency is made clear by looking at IEPs
through the lens of the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) Analysis framework, a business strategic planning
7
tool now used across a variety of disciplines including education.
SWOT calls for strategy decisions to be informed by a balanced
understanding of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and
8
Threats. Currently, when developing a student’s plan for learning,
the statutory language of the Act mandates IEP teams to consider a
variety of factors including “the strengths of each child,” “the concerns of the parents,” “the results of the . . . most recent evaluation
of the child,” and “the academic, developmental, and functional
9
needs of the child.” Putting this language in the SWOT framework, IEP teams must consider the Strengths and Weaknesses of
the child, as well as Opportunities for growth and progress. There
is no mandate, however, to also evaluate potential Threats.
This Note will argue that, particularly in light of Endrew F., an
amendment to the IDEA incorporating threat analysis into IEPs is

3. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1002
(2017).
4. Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F. One Year Later: An Updated Outcomes Analysis, 352 EDUC. L. REP. 448, 454 (2018) (“[A]t this first anniversary of Endrew F. the net effect
appears to have been close to negligible.”). See also infra Part II.c.
5. Id. at 453.
6. See infra Part I.b.
7. See infra Part III.a.
8. Id.
9. 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(3)(A) (2012).
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necessary to create clarity for the courts regarding Congress’ intentions and to help parents and school personnel work together to
best serve students. Part I will introduce the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s main substantive provisions, as well as the
procedural protections afforded to students covered by the Act and
10
their parents or guardians. It will go into detail regarding the substance of IEPs and the problems schools face in successfully implementing them. Lastly, it will discuss how the Act defines an adequate education, termed a ‘free and appropriate public
education,’ or ‘FAPE.’
Part II will first discuss the pre-Endrew F. standard for determining whether a student was receiving FAPE and how it was applied
in lower courts. Next, it will examine the Endrew F. holding and its
subsequent application in lower courts. It will conclude with a
summary of how schools and courts seem to view their obligations
today, arguing that Endrew F. on its own is not enough to achieve
substantive change in IEP implementation.
Part III will outline the proposed reform: an amendment that
explicitly requires IEPs to include a “statement of any factors affecting the school environment but outside the child’s control
that, based on the experience or insight of any team member, may
impede the child’s progress toward her stated goals, and a statement of the strategies to be employed in that eventuality.” Substantively, this will lead to IEPs that are more robust in the first instance, rather than requiring teams to re-convene in a reactive
manner and edit them as problems arise. Procedurally, it will create a clear obligatory step for courts to look for in determining
whether an IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress” or not.
Part IV will conclude by examining bullying as an example of a
barrier to the achievement of students with disabilities that might
be mitigated by the proposed reform. It will also briefly outline
several other examples of threats faced by students with disabilities
and will discuss how they could be better managed if they were explicitly taken into account under a reformed IDEA regime.

10. Guardians are included in the definition of “parent” in the Act. 20 U.S.C § 1401
(23) (2012). For simplicity, “parents” will be used throughout this piece.
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LEGAL PROTECTION AT SCHOOL FOR STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES: THE IDEA

Students with disabilities have been excluded from the classroom, either informally or by law, for the majority of this country’s
11
history. The Supreme Court’s seminal ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education paved the way for advocates to argue that children with
disabilities were entitled equal access to public schools the same as
12
any other child. Two cases at the district court level raised awareness regarding these issues and laid the foundation for eventual
statutory reform. In Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC)
v. Pennsylvania, the court held that Pennsylvania’s statutes excluding “retarded children” from public education did not pass rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause: after deciding to
provide public education, the state had no colorable reason to de13
ny that education to one group of children. This argument was
extended to cover all children with disabilities in Mills v. Board of
Education of District of Columbia, with the court rejecting the school’s
14
defense of insufficient funds.
While these two decisions offered a strong basis for change, they
did not come with any specific instructions to schools, other than a
requirement to include children with disabilities in public educational institutions. Additionally, they did not provide a nationwide
mandate. Congress created these affirmative obligations in the Ed15
ucation for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).
This legislation has been modified and reauthorized over time. As
of the 1990 amendments, it is known as the Individuals with Disa16
bilities Education Act (IDEA). Supplemented by the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the
IDEA is the core source of statutory authority regarding both sub11. The Segregation of Students with Disabilities, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Feb. 7,
2018), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Segregation-SWD_508.pdf (“As late as the
1960s, it was standard for students with disabilities to be completely excluded from the public education system.”).
12. DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW 469 (2d ed. 2016).
13. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Com. of Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (“[P]laintiffs question whether the state, having undertaken to provide public education to some children (perhaps all children) may deny it to plaintiffs entirely. We are satisfied that the evidence raises serious doubts (and hence a colorable claim) as to the existence
of a rational basis for such exclusions.”).
14. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972) (“[F]ailure to fulfill this clear duty to . . . provide [these children] with publicly-supported education . . .
cannot be excused by the claim that there are insufficient funds.”).
15. BLACK, supra note 12, at 470.
16. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975) (current
version at 20 U.S.C § 1400 (2012)). See generally Timeline of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), U. KAN. SCH. EDUC., https://educationonline.ku.edu/community/ideatimeline (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
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stantive rights and procedural protections in school for students
with disabilities. 17
A. Main Provisions and Protections of the IDEA
There is a two-part test to determine whether a child is covered
by the IDEA. First, the child must have a disability specifically
enumerated under the statute. 18 Many chronic conditions such as
diabetes or cancer do not fall under the enumerated disabilities
19
list. This disability must also “adversely affect [the child’s] educa20
tional performance.” Second, the child must need both special
education and related services. Special education is the adaptation
of content, methodology, or delivery of instruction to meet a
21
child’s unique needs. Related services are defined as “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability to
22
benefit from special education.” Children who do not meet all of
these requirements can sometimes receive assistance in school under the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which are less re23
strictive in their eligibility requirements.
Once a student is found to be eligible, the IDEA instructs
schools to ensure they are providing the student FAPE in the least
24
restrictive environment (LRE) by implementing an IEP.
The primary purpose of the IDEA is to “ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
25
education.” The FAPE standard was first outlined in regulations
26
for § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and has its origins in the idea
27
of a “free and adequate public education” outlined in Mills. FAPE
consists of “special education and related services that (A) have
been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State

17. BLACK, supra note 12, at 470.
18. BLACK, supra note 12, at 471. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012)
(“[I]ntellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as ‘emotional disturbance’), orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities . . .”).
19. BLACK, supra note 12, at 471.
20. Id.
21. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3) (2018).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2012).
23. BLACK, supra note 12, at 472.
24. See generally BLACK, supra note 12, at 469–546.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012).
26. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33.
27. See Mills v. Bd. of Ed. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
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educational agency; (C) include an appropriate . . . education in
the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the in28
dividualized education program.”
Students are also required to be educated in the “least restrictive
29
environment” appropriate based on their circumstances. While
not clearly defined by the statute, “restrictive” is understood in the
context of proximity to the general education classroom—
educational environments exist on a continuum, ranging from totally separated to totally integrated, and a school should always
strive to place a child in the most integrated settings possible that
30
still meet their individualized needs. This provision was meant to
address the historical practice of segregating students with disabili31
ties away from general classrooms. By contrast, Congress wanted
children to see that “disability is a natural part of the human expe32
rience.” The statute creates a presumption towards integration
into general classrooms, permitting segregation only if a child’s
33
circumstance demands it. In Daniel R.R., Daniel’s parents were
challenging the school’s decision to essentially fully segregate him;
he only interacted with non-special education students at lunch
34
and at recess. The court found this segregation to be acceptable:
Daniel’s speech and learning difficulties were so advanced that he
was getting essentially no benefit from the general education classroom, and modifying the classroom to meet his needs would have
35
taken “all or most of” his teacher’s time. This situation is an extreme, however; schools are required to strive for inclusion in regular classroom settings to the greatest extent possible based on the
child’s needs.
Under the IDEA, students with disabilities also receive protections related to disciplinary violations. If a student is found to be in
violation of their school’s code of student conduct, the school is
required to make a determination as to whether the student’s conduct was “caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to,
[their] disability” or was “the direct result of the local educational
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012).
29. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (2012).
30. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Schools
must provide a free appropriate public education and must do so, to the maximum extent
appropriate, in regular education classrooms. But when education in a regular classroom
cannot meet the handicapped child’s unique needs, the presumption in favor of mainstreaming is overcome and the school need not place the child in regular education.”).
31. See The Segregation of Students with Disabilities, supra note 11.
32. Sue Swenson, Taking Intellectual Disability Seriously Shows Us That Education Is a Human Right, 42 HUM. RTS., 18, 19 (2017) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(1) (2012)).
33. Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 174, 174 (2007).
34. Daniel R.R., 847 F.2d at 1039.
35. Id. at 1050–51.
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agency’s failure to implement the IEP.” 36 If so, the school is directed to take corrective steps to attempt to prevent the behavior
from happening in the future, but generally cannot suspend, expel, or transfer the student, or otherwise change the student’s
37
placement, unless the parents agree.
The statute also includes procedural protections for students
38
and their families. Parents in particular are meant to play a significant role in the special education process. The procedural safeguards aimed at making parent participation meaningful have
39
been a part of the IDEA’s design from the beginning, and the
40
2004 reauthorization of the Act reaffirmed this commitment.
Parents have the right to examine all records related to their child
and to participate in any meetings having to do with their child’s
41
educational placement or the provision of FAPE. They are entitled to written notice any time there is a change, or a refusal on the
school’s part to make a change, to their child’s educational place42
43
ment. There are provisions for both due process and mediation
44
proceedings in the event of disagreement between the school and
the parents, with eventual recourse to federal courts if no resolu45
tion is reached. Students are to stay in their current educational
46
placement until any dispute is resolved.
B. IEPs in Theory
The workhorse innovation of the IDEA is the requirement to
create an IEP for any child with a qualifying disability who is to re47
ceive special education services from their school. IEPs are often
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E) (2012). This is commonly called a manifestation determination review (MDR).
37. EDUC. L. CTR., THE RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA: A GUIDE FOR
PARENTS AND ADVOCATES 62–71 (2016), https://www.elc-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/03/ELC_Right_to_SpecialEducation_revisedapndx_Sept2016.pdf.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (2012) (“Almost 30 years of research and experience has
demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective
by . . . strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such
children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at
school and at home.”); 20 U.S.C § 1400 (c)(8) (“Parents and schools should be given expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in positive and constructive ways.”).
41. § 1415(b)(1).
42. § 1415(b)(3).
43. § 1415(b)(6).
44. § 1415(e).
45. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
46. § 1415(j). This is commonly called the “stay-put” provision.
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2012); Megan Roberts, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and
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described as contracts between schools and parents, 48 outlining
what services the school is to provide in a level of detail that allows
for an assessment of how those services will help a child make pro49
gress.
The IEP process begins by identifying and evaluating a student
50
who might be eligible for services under the IDEA. A parent may
51
ask to have their child evaluated, but schools also have an affirmative obligation—known as “child find”—to ensure that children
52
with disabilities are “identified, located, and evaluated.” Some
schools address their child find obligation by offering developmental screenings or other regularly scheduled testing opportunities;
others rely on teachers and other school personnel, most of whom
will have had basic training or familiarity with special education, to
53
identify students that they think need to be evaluated. The IDEA
has a detailed list of what tools, procedures, and experts should be
employed when evaluating a child to ensure as complete a picture
54
as possible of the child’s disability. Schools are required to provide parents with a copy of this evaluation report, regardless of the
55
outcome.
Finding that a child has a disability covered by the Act, and is eligible for special education and related services, triggers the creation of an IEP. Any child with the requisite disability and eligibility
56
must have an IEP in effect at all times. The group that meets to
develop and periodically revise a student’s IEP, or the “IEP team,”
must include at a minimum the student’s parents; at least one regular education and special education teacher; a school or district
representative who is qualified to provide or supervise specially designed instruction, who understands the school’s resources, and is
familiar with the general education curriculum (generally, a special education director); someone who can interpret any evalua-

Educators, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1049 (2008) (“To achieve this goal, the EAHCA included
certain key provisions that have remained consistent throughout the many later versions of
the Act; three fundamental and continuing requirements of the EAHCA are (1) that children with disabilities receive Individualized Education Programs (IEPs); (2) that schools
provide to students with disabilities a free and appropriate public education (FAPE); and
(3) that this education occur in the least restrictive environment (LRE) appropriate.”).
48. See Perry A. Zirkel & Edward T. Bauer, The Third Dimension of FAPE Under the IDEA:
IEP Implementation, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 409, 420 & n.53 (2016).
49. EDUC. L. CTR., supra note 37, at 31.
50. Id. at 12.
51. § 1414(a)(1)(B).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2012).
53. See generally EDUC. L. CTR., supra note 37, at 13.
54. § 1414(b).
55. § 1414(b)(4)(B).
56. § 1414(d)(2).
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tions of the child (generally, a special education director or school
psychologist); and, when appropriate, the child.57
In general, the IEP team is to consider a broad set of inputs
58
when developing an IEP. These include the strengths of the
child, the parents’ concerns regarding their child, the results of
any relevant evaluations, and the “academic, developmental, and
59
functional needs of the child,” as well as special factors such as a
child’s behavior, limited English proficiency, or particular com60
munication needs relating to their disability.
The IDEA lays out a thorough accounting of the specific infor61
mation that must be included in an IEP. It must include a statement of the child’s present academic achievement and behavioral
performance, annual goals along with plans for measurement and
progress reporting, a statement of the “special education and related services” to be provided, and an explanation of when, if at all,
the child will “not participate with nondisabled children in the
62
regular class.” Additionally, the IEP must cover any modifications
the student will receive when they take state and district assessments, the start date for services and the “frequency, location, and
duration” of services, and for students over sixteen, goals related to
their transition out of school including “training, education, em63
ployment, and . . . independent living skills.”
Once created, the IEP team must review the plan “periodically,
but not less frequently than annually, to determine whether the
64
annual goals for the child are being achieved.” The IEP is to be
revised to address lack of expected progress, as well as information
provided by the parents, a child’s anticipated needs, or “other mat65
ters.” This might mean a child exceeding or meeting one of their
66
goals or a major change in a child’s life such as illness or surgery.
Conceptually, IEPs are meant to be a resource for both parties:
they outline for parents exactly what to expect, and outline for
schools exactly what they are supposed to do. IEPs are the ultimate
repudiation of the factory approach to educating students with dis-

57. § 1414(d)(1)(B); see also EDUC. L. CTR., supra note 37, at 31–32.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3) (2012).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (2012).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B) (2012).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i) (2012).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
66. Requesting a Meeting to Review Your Child’s IEP, CTR. FOR PARENT INFO. & RESOURCES,
https://www.parentcenterhub.org/iep-2/ (noting that parents have the ability, as members
of the IEP team, to request that their child’s IEP be reviewed and revised in light of particular life events).
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abilities— a historical approach that would lump together any students who were identified as struggling, no matter their individual
needs. 67 The idea that every student has the potential to succeed,
even if they have a disability, logically flows to the conclusion that
every student can benefit from an individual plan tailored to help
68
them achieve that success. An argument can be made that by creating the IEP structure, the IDEA has made incredible strides in
ensuring that these students are not left behind. Previously, close
to two million children with disabilities were excluded from public
69
schools. Today, six million children are currently served by an
70
IEP.
C. IEPs in Practice
In practice, the successful implementation of an IEP after a student has been successfully identified is a difficult task. These difficulties range from the substantive to the procedural. At a basic level, a child’s IEP is sometimes defective. Missing data, poorly written
goals and objectives, weak linkages between goals and the services
provided, and a lack of systematic progress monitoring are all examples of major content flaws that will eventually affect a child’s
71
achievement.
Schools can face challenges in implementing an IEP even if it is
rigorously developed. First, the IDEA has no mandatory attendance requirement at IEP team meetings. While the Act outlines the
required composition of an IEP team, the presence of any particular member is not required if “the parent of a child with a disability
and the local educational agency agree that the attendance of such
72
member is not necessary.” Practically, this can look like a school
administrator telling a parent that a given teacher cannot attend

67. Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jul. 19, 2007), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.html
(“Before the enactment of Public Law 94-142 . . . [t]oo often, persons with disabilities . . .
were merely accommodated rather than assessed, educated, and rehabilitated.”).
68. See Tracy Thompson, The Special-Education Charade, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 3, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/the-charade-of-specialeducation-programs/421578/ (“And so, the IEP meeting, which is where the overarching
purpose of federal law (‘to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a
free appropriate public education . . . [that provides] services to meet their unique needs’)
meets the nitty gritty question: How do we do that for this particular child?”).
69. About IDEA: History of the IDEA, DEP’T OF EDUC., https://sites.ed.gov/idea/aboutidea/#IDEA-History.
70. Swenson, supra note 32, at 20.
71. James Gallagher & Laura Desimone, Lessons Learned from Implementation of the IEP:
Applications to the IFSP, 15 TOPICS IN EARLY CHILDHOOD SPECIAL EDUC. 353, 356 (1995).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(c)(i) (2012).
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and that others will take their place during the meeting, with the
parent agreeing rather than risking delay if the meeting is re73
scheduled. It is easy to imagine the scenarios that can follow when
IEP team members are absent: a missing special education teacher
leads to parents left with unanswered questions about a proposed
intervention; a missing general education teacher leads to a misunderstanding about how they are supposed to implement the IEP;
a missing school official leads to the team deciding on a transportation strategy that is not logistically feasible for the district.
Second, many schools experience a lack of capacity on the part
of teachers to properly execute the IEP. Although the IEP is a contract between the school and the parents, the people responsible
for its implementation in the day-to-day classroom environment
are the teachers. Teachers must, as agents of the school, receive
appropriate information from their school so they understand and
can execute their obligations under the IEPs for any students in
74
their classroom. Take, for example, a teacher with two students
with IEPs that include fairly common modifications: one requires
both oral and printed directions, and one requires the teacher to
75
stand near the student when giving directions. This teacher will
always have to read directions out loud and have them in writing,
and will always have to stand in a particular place when giving directions. While this might seem manageable, imagine the same
scenario with six or ten students with IEPs in one classroom, all potentially being revised throughout the course of the school year.
The pull on a teacher’s time, between modifying curriculum, fill-

73. In fact, the 2004 IDEA amendments included a provision allowing IEPs to be
amended by written document, without convening an IEP team meeting, in recognition of
the fact that these meetings can be difficult to convene. In this situation, all team members
are required to be notified of any changes, though there is no provision indicating that all
team members must agree on changes before they go into effect. See Jeffrey A. Knight, When
Close Enough Doesn’t Cut It: Why Courts Should Want to Steer Clear of Determining What Is—and
What Is Not—Material in a Child’s Individual Education Program, 41 U. TOL L. R. 375, 391
(2010). This procedural bypass is likely helpful in decreasing the administrative burden
teams might otherwise face in order to make small, routine changes. It is disturbing, however, to consider the possibility that extensive or substantive changes might be made completely legally without anyone with relevant expertise discussing with the parents firsthand what
exactly is being done to the IEP. With written amendments, the give-and-take discussion of
an in-person IEP meeting is lost, and along with it, one of the key chances for parents to advocate for their student.
74. EDUC. L. CTR., supra note 37, at 45 (“When the IEP is approved, the school must
explain to its staff their responsibilities and the specific supports, modifications, and accommodations that they must give the child under the IEP.”).
75. School Accommodation and Modification Ideas for Students Who Receive Special Education
Services, PACER CTR. (2015), https://www.ctdinstitute.org/sites/default/files/file_
attachments/School%20Accommodation%20and%20Modification%20Ideas%20for%20
Students%20who%20Receive%20Special%20Education%20Services%20English.pdf.
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ing out reporting and progress monitoring documents, and attending IEP meetings, can stretch them beyond capacity.
A third issue, related to lack of capacity within a school, is a
shortage of necessary resources, such as modified curricular supports, adaptive furniture, or specialized staff. The presence of a
school administrator on the IEP team who understands the
school’s resources ideally prevents the school from promising services that they cannot offer. It is still the case, however, that the
school might know a better strategy or intervention exists for a
child, but simply cannot afford it or fit it into their school structure. Alternatively, the school might not be able to afford the level
of staffing needed to properly implement the IEPs of all students
in the building as written. Congress has never fully funded the
IDEA’s mandates, and federal funding covers less than 20% of the
estimated excess cost to schools and districts of educating students
76
with disabilities. If state legislatures do not make up the shortfall,
districts must rely on what they raise through property taxes, fundraising, or other measures. A lack of adequate funding for special
education can result in IEPs not being properly implemented in a
variety of ways.
A fourth issue is the difficulty of achieving the leveling of power
between parents and school officials that the IDEA seeks to attain.
A parent’s role can be limited if school officials do not think the
parents are qualified to participate or make constructive contribu77
tions. Pragmatically, a parent’s role can also be limited if they
have difficulty getting time off work to attend meetings, limited
English proficiency, lack of experience with or understanding of
the school environment, or face any other structural barriers to
successful advocacy on behalf of their child.
Fifth, the procedural safeguards of the IDEA, meant to empower
parents and address these situations where schools do not follow
through on their obligations, are difficult to access for all but the
most well-resourced parents, have uncertain outcomes, and can
78
take a long time. The IDEA provides parents with opportunities
to challenge decisions they do not agree with regarding their
child’s educational placement through resolution meetings, due
79
process, or mediation. Once all administrative remedies are exhausted, parents have the ability to bring suit in state or federal

76. BLACK, supra note 12, at 470.
77. Gallagher & Desimone, supra note 71, at 361.
78. See Kevin Hoagland-Hanson, Comment, Getting Their Due (Process): Parents and Lawyers in Special Education Due Process Hearings in Pennsylvania, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1805 (2015).
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012).
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court. 80 These options are often difficult to navigate, intimidating,
and time-consuming, particularly without the support of an advocate or a lawyer. While many non-profit advocacy organizations exist to provide support to parents in the IEP process, they cannot
81
serve everyone. In a review of due process hearings from 1978 to
2012, parents won 58% of cases where they were represented by an
82
advocate and just 14% of cases when they were not.
D. FAPE: An Appropriate Education Defined Under the IDEA
The IDEA seeks to guarantee that “all children with disabilities
83
have available to them a free appropriate public education.” The
definition of what comprises an “appropriate” education sufficient
to meet this FAPE standard is one of the most frequently litigated
84
portions of the IDEA. The IEP is essentially a memorialization of
how the school is proposing to provide FAPE to a student, and is
therefore at the center of any dispute regarding whether a school
85
is meeting its obligations under the IDEA or not. This is, arguably, the crux of the statute—the requirements, procedural protections, and funding allocations are all put in place to ensure that
students with disabilities get an education. That mandate, however,
seems to leave open to interpretation “how much” education is
meant to be provided.
The Supreme Court first clarified this standard in Rowley, a case
involving a student who was deaf, Amy Rowley, whose parents
86
wanted a sign-language interpreter to be included in her IEP.
The school refused, and her parents appealed. A hearing officer
agreed with the school, saying, “Amy was achieving educationally,
academically, and socially” without an interpreter, and that the
87
school was therefore meeting its obligation to provide a FAPE.
The Rowleys asked for review from a district court, which found
that although Amy’s performance was above average, she could
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012).
81. See, e.g., Ensuring Equal Access, EDUC. L. CTR., https://www.elc-pa.org/ensuringequal-access/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); Who We Serve: Students with Disabilities, ADVOC.
FOR CHILD. N.Y., https://www.advocatesforchildren.org/who_we_serve/students_with_
disabilities (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
82. G. Thomas Schanding et al., Analysis of Special Education Due Process Hearings in Texas, SAGE OPEN, Apr.–June 2017 at 2, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/
2158244017715057.
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012).
84. BLACK, supra note 12, at 504.
85. Id. at 503 (calling IEPs “the linchpin for services under the IDEA.”).
86. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184
(1982).
87. Id. at 185.
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learn more if she were not deaf, and therefore needed a signlanguage interpreter to achieve her true potential. 88 This “disparity
between Amy’s achievement and her potential” led the district
89
court to find she was being denied a FAPE.
The Supreme Court reversed, taking particular issue with the
district court’s attempt to create their own standard for a FAPE
90
without adequately assessing congressional intent. While acknowledging that the Act does not contain any “substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped
children,” the court held that based on the legislative history of the
Act, its intent was “more to open the door of public education to
handicapped children . . . than to guarantee any particular level of
91
education once inside.” Refusing to adopt the standard advocated
by the plaintiffs—that of “maxim[izing] the potential of each
92
handicapped child” —the court concluded that the Act calls for
“access to specialized instruction and related services which are in93
dividually designed to provide educational benefit.” In order to
achieve provision of a FAPE, IEPs must be “reasonably calculated
94
to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” The court
confined its analysis to the case of a student who was performing
above average in a regular classroom, rather than articulating a
standard that could be applied to determine whether any child
95
covered by the Act is receiving educational benefit. Lower courts
have subsequently interpreted the Rowley standard in a variety of
ways, ranging from a “meaningful benefit” to a “some benefit”
96
standard.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 189–190 (“Certainly the language of the statute contains no requirement like
the one imposed by the lower courts . . . That standard was expounded by the District Court
without reference to the statutory definitions or even to the legislative history of the Act.”).
91. Id. at 189, 192.
92. Id. at 200.
93. Id. at 201.
94. Id. at 207. This is one part of a two-part test outlined in Rowley to determine whether FAPE has been provided. A court is also required to determine whether the state entity in
question has “complied with the procedures” of the Act. Id. at 206–07. Often, however, any
procedural violations are de minimis, and so the focus of analysis is generally whether a child
received educational benefit from their IEP. BLACK, supra note 12, at 511.
95. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 (“Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped
child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our
analysis to that situation.”).
96. Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has
Been Interpreted, 247 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009). See also infra Part II.a.
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The latest amendments to the IDEA were passed in 2004. 97 This
reauthorization was designed in part to align the IDEA with the No
Child Left Behind Act’s focus on raising expectations for learning
and achievement, and on outcomes rather than process and com98
pliance. The purpose of the IDEA was amended to indicate, in
line with No Child Left Behind, that there should be an emphasis
on “high expectations”: schools should work to ensure access to
the general education environment so that students with disabilities can “meet . . . to the maximum extent possible, the challenging
99
expectations that have been established for all children.” This
change in language, however, also provides further support for an
idea articulated by the Rowley court, that “educational benefit”
100
must mean something more than de minimis access to school.
Overall, the IDEA is a strong framework of protections for students with disabilities in public school settings. Moreover, rather
than just setting a protective floor, it is inherently aspirational,
seeking to integrate students with disabilities into mainstream environments and recognize they too can achieve in the classroom.
IEPs as the main operative tool of the IDEA are very thoroughly
outlined in the statute, but in practice are not always implemented
with a high level of fidelity. Parents can attempt to remediate what
they see as a deficient provision of services by challenging their
student’s IEP, alleging that the school is not providing a FAPE as
required by the Act. Rowley was the first Supreme Court case to
squarely address the question of what level of “educational benefit”
was intended by Congress when it passed the IDEA.
II. THE ENDREW F. STANDARD AND ITS APPLICATION IN
COURTS AND SCHOOLS
The two-part test developed in Rowley gave lower courts a standard to use when determining whether a child was receiving a FAPE.
The test was not, however, uniformly interpreted across the circuits—some used a “meaningful benefit” standard while others

97. Timeline of Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), U. KAN. SCH. EDUC.,
https://educationonline.ku.edu/community/idea-timeline (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
98. Kathleen B. Boundy, Examining the 2004 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: What Advocates for Students and Parents Need to Know, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J.
POVERTY L. POL’Y 550, 551 (2006), https://www.cleweb.org/sites/cleweb.org/files/assets/
2004%20Amendments%20to%20IDEA%20boundy_0.pdf.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (2012); see also Boundy, supra note 98, at 551.
100. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200–01 (“It would do little good for Congress to spend millions
of dollars in providing access . . . to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that
education.”).
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used a lower “some benefit” standard. 101 While the Supreme
102
Court’s decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1 does
seem to have established that an IEP must provide more than
“some benefit” to achieve a FAPE, there are still open questions
about how exactly it will be implemented in schools, and whether
any changes in implementation will lead to greater compliance
with the IDEA’s mandate. Early data suggests the new standard has
not led to a significant shift in how lower courts conceptualize
103
FAPE in the context of IEPs.
A. The Pre-Endrew F. Standard: Interpreting Rowley
Rowley established a two-part test for courts to use when asked to
resolve an IEP complaint under § 1415(e)(2) of the Act: “First, has
the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And
second, is the [IEP] developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?” 104 Although there is agreement the “benefits” requirement is
105
more than de minimis, circuits have generally split into two categories: those that apply a “meaningful benefit” standard and those
that apply a lower “some educational benefit” standard. 106
The Third Circuit stands out for its rigorous and continuous application of a higher standard, consistently using the words “mean107
ingful educational benefit” in its opinions. The Court of Appeals
derives this standard by focusing on the text and legislative history
of the Act, in addition to the Rowley language, as indicating that
“the state must provide some sort of meaningful education—more
108
than mere access to the schoolhouse door.” Acknowledging the
Supreme Court’s warning from Rowley that courts not “interfer[e]
with educational methodology” and tell schools in great detail how

101. Compare Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 179 (3d
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Rowley Court described the level of benefit conferred by the Act as
‘meaningful.’”) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192), with A.B. ex rel D.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315,
319 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The FAPE must only be ‘calculated to confer some educational benefit
on a disabled child.’”) (emphasis in original).
102. 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
103. See generally Zirkel, supra note 4.
104. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07.
105. See generally Wenkart, supra note 96.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988).
See also Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.
2004); T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000); Ridgewood
Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (superseded on other
grounds).
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they should be educating students, the Third Circuit nevertheless
sees this elevated standard as in line with its duty to enforce the
109
statutory provisions of the Act.
Other circuits seem to support the “meaningful benefit” standard, though the language they use can be ambiguous. The Second
Circuit in Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. Of Educ., for example, begins by
stating that IEPs must be calculated to achieve “some ‘meaningful
110
benefit.’” It also agrees that the standard means more than
111
“mere trivial advancement,” finally landing on the student’s
“meaningful progress” as the appropriate indicator of whether a
112
student is receiving a FAPE. However, the words “benefit” and
“progress” also appear throughout the opinion without any modi113
fiers, making it unclear how rigorous the standard is. Additionally, the court frames the question before it as “whether the district
court justifiably concluded that M.M. was not receiving adequate
educational benefit in the public school system,” introducing the
new term “adequate” without any clear definition of what level of
benefit the word is meant to convey. 114 The court’s opinion in Mrs.
B discusses factors that might contribute to an understanding of
benefit and progress, such as grades and test scores, but sticks to
115
the facts of the case in determining how those factors cut. It is
therefore difficult to come to any generalized understanding of
how much “benefit” the student was due.
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit as well as the First, Fourth, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all characterize the IDEA as requiring
116
only “some benefit” or a similarly stated lower standard.

109. Polk, 853 F.2d at 184.
110. Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).
111. Id. at 1121 (citing Polk, 853 F.2d at 183).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g.¸ id. at 1120 (“[W]e must consider whether the district court justifiably concluded that M.M. was not receiving adequate educational benefit in the public school system.”); id. at 1118 (“[A]t Devereux, a program that provided M.M. with the highly structured setting recommended in the Yale evaluations, M.M. showed some progress.”); id. at
1122 (“[T]he state had to fund the program because it was necessary for M.M. to make educational progress.”); id. (“[T]he court must determine whether the child requires the residential program to receive educational benefit.”).
114. Id. at 1120.
115. See id. at 1121.
116. See A.B. ex rel D.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The FAPE must
only be ‘calculated to confer some educational benefit on a disabled child.’”); O’Toole ex rel.
O’Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 708 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“In sum, our review of the record in this case convinces us that Molly’s IEPs, even if ‘not
optimal,’ . . . were calculated to, and did, confer some educational benefits, as required by
the IDEA and Kansas law.”); Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir.
1997) (“The court erred by requiring a program to maximize Nicholas’ ability, by comparing his progress to non-disabled students . . . .”); G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d
942, 948 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Barring higher state standards for the handicapped, a FAPE is
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Although this circuit split would seem to be significant, it is unclear that these varying interpretations affect how an IEP is ultimately adjudicated. 117 A common theme across the circuits is to determine whether an IEP was “reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits” in large part based on the
student’s outcomes, rather than by using some standard understanding of “benefit” or by interrogating the IEP itself or the pro118
cess by which it was developed. Ronald D. Wenkart, a school district attorney and author of numerous practice guides for
education law, counsels attorneys representing students to focus on
“evidence [that shows] whether the child is making educational
119
progress.” Additionally, the first prong of the court’s test requires
120
only procedural compliance with the text of the Act. This focus
on outcomes rather than inputs most likely arises from the Court’s
statement in Rowley that “once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology
are for resolution by the States.” 121 This judicial reluctance means
that courts are unlikely to clarify for either schools or for parents
how they should be constructing IEPs to be in line with the mandates of the IDEA.
B. Endrew F.’s Background and Holding
Perhaps acknowledging the confusion in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty.
Sch. Dist. Re-1 in 2017. 122 Endrew F. was a student with autism who
had received IEPs continuously since preschool in the same school
district. 123 By fourth grade, his parents felt his progress had stalled
and the district could no longer serve his needs, and chose instead
to enroll him in a private school and ask the school district to re124
imburse his tuition. The school district challenged them, saying

simply one which fulfills the minimum federal statutory requirements.”); Lunceford v. D.C.
Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The EAHCA does not secure
the best education money can buy; it calls upon government, more modestly, to provide
an appropriate education for each child.”) (emphasis in original).
117. See generally Zirkel, supra note 4.
118. See Wenkart, supra note 96, at 30 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
119. Id.
120. See Wenkart, supra note 96 and accompanying text.
121. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
122. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
123. Id. at 991.
124. Id. If a district cannot provide the necessary supports or services to achieve a FAPE,
and the student instead enrolls in another school or academic setting that can provide a
FAPE, the district is required to bear any associated costs; that district remains the student’s
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that the IEP proposed by the district met the standard of FAPE required by the IDEA, and therefore, the district could not be re125
quired to reimburse his tuition at another school. The lower
courts, in finding for the school district, used a standard closer to
“some benefit.” The Tenth Circuit held that he was only due “educational benefit [that is] . . . more than de minimis,” 126 and concluded that Endrew’s IEP had been “reasonably calculated to enable [him] to make some progress.” 127
The importance of this case is demonstrated by the Supreme
Court’s acknowledgement that the question in Endrew F. is broader
than that posed in Rowley—Amy Rowley was fully integrated into
her school’s regular classrooms, and the court confined its analysis
128
to that set of facts. Taking on Endrew F. required the court to
“endorse . . . one standard for determining ‘when handicapped
children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the
requirements of the Act,’” even if, like Endrew, they required more
intensive supports than Rowley and were not fully integrated into
their school’s classrooms. 129
The Court was clear first that Rowley intended more than the
130
“some educational benefit” standard advanced by the district. At
the other end of the spectrum, it declined to take up the standard
proposed by Endrew’s parents, that FAPE means “an education
that aims to provide a child with a disability opportunities to
achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to
society that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded
131
children without disabilities.” Instead, the Court charted a “middle ground” and held that “[t]o meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.” 132

public school, and as such is still charged with fulfilling the student’s IEP, even if they have
to pay another entity to do so.
125. Id.
126. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 1342 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202
(1982).
129. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
130. Id. at 998 (“More important, the school district’s reading of these isolated statements runs headlong into several points on which Rowley is crystal clear . . . It would not
have been ‘difficult’ for us to say when educational benefits are sufficient if we had just said
that any educational benefit was enough. And it would have been strange to refuse to set out
a test for the adequacy of educational benefits if we had just done exactly that. We cannot
accept the school district’s reading of Rowley.”) (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 1001.
132. Id. at 999.
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Expanding on the words “reasonably calculated”, which also appeared in Rowley, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the words “reflect[] a recognition that crafting an appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgment by school officials. . . .
[T]his fact-intensive exercise will be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also by the input of the child’s par133
ents or guardians.” The use of the phrase “child’s circumstances”
reflects the IDEA’s “focus on the particular child.” 134
C. Post-Endrew F., What Comprises FAPE in the
Lower Courts?
In the immediate aftermath of Endrew F., advocates seemed to
generally feel that the decision represented a raising of the standard required to provide FAPE under the IDEA, with the Council
for Parent Attorneys and Advocates noting that “we expect this
unanimous decision . . . to be transformative in the lives of the students and families for whom the law is intended to benefit.” 135 Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos wrote that “challenging students
with disabilities” would “empower[] them” and raise the standards
considered acceptable for such students. 136
However, while the standard might seem higher on paper, it is
unclear if it will lead to a substantially larger number of cases coming out in favor of students. In a study of forty-nine IEP rulings
made by a hearing officer under the pre-Endrew F. standard and
then revisited by a district court within the first year post-Endrew F.,
137
90% of the rulings were unchanged by the district court. Of
those that changed, two were still on remand at the time of the
analysis and one had been reversed in favor of the district, leaving
only two that were reversed in favor of the student. One of those
reversals, notably, was Endrew’s case, which had been remanded by
138
the Supreme Court for consideration under the new standard.
The other, S. B. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., while finding the
school’s provision of FAPE deficient on substantive grounds, seems
to simply recite the Endrew F. standard—within the discussion sec133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Christina Samuels, Advocates Hail Supreme Court Ruling on Special Education Rights,
EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 22, 2017, 5:42 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2017/03/
advocates_hail_supreme_court_r.html.
136. Christina Samuels, A Year Ago the Supreme Court Raised the Bar for Special Ed. What’s
Happened Since?, EDUC. WEEK (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2018/05/02/a-year-ago-the-supreme-court-raised.html.
137. Zirkel, supra note 4, at 450.
138. See id.
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tion of the opinion, it only substantively engages with other
S.D.N.Y and Second Circuit cases, which were all functionally decided before Endrew F. and which only cite preexisting Second Cir139
cuit precedent.
Of course, it is possible that these cases were not close calls—
that under any standard, it would have been clear that the school
in question was, in fact, meeting its obligations. But as opposed to
deciding their cases on the merits of the Endrew F. test, it seems
that some of these lower court decisions had trouble engaging with
140
the standard at all. Alternatively, others simply stated that the test
141
was the same or “substantively similar” to their previous test. This
indicates a continuing confusion regarding the exact standard required by the IDEA for meeting FAPE. This confusion was not resolved in any significant way by the Endrew F. decision. While the
opinion’s dicta may have provided “untapped veins for the parties’
attorneys to mine,” this sort of legal wrangling may not significantly
impact the day-to-day decision making of school authorities or the
142
outcomes of administrative-level hearings for some time.
D. Post-Endrew F., What Deference is Owed to the
Choices of School Personnel?
Another important question raised by Endrew F. is the amount of
deference that will be given to school personnel in their choices
and expertise when creating IEPs. A clear mandate on deference
might provide some information regarding how the standard is
likely to be applied and how school districts might or might not
subsequently change their behavior with regard to IEPs. Endrew F.
states that “deference is based on the application of expertise and

139. See S.B. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 2017 WL 4326502, at *12–18 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 2017). The only post-Endrew F. case discussed by the S.B. court had been briefed
before the Endrew F. opinion was issued, and the court in that case chose not to take Endrew F.
into account. See J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 690 F. App’x 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“Because we conclude that the School District failed to provide T.C. with a free and appropriate public education under the existing precedent in this circuit, we need not decide
whether Endrew F. raised the bar for a free and appropriate public education or left Second
Circuit precedent intact (the Supreme Court’s decision certainly did not reduce the force of
the requirement).”).
140. Zirkel, supra note 4, at 450 (“Second, the lower courts’ treatment of Endrew F. remains rather cursory, with limited and scattered, rather than skewed, use of its various dicta.”).
141. Id. at 452 (“[T]hree of the fifteen cases during this second six-month period recognized the lack of material difference between their pre-existing substantive standard and
that of Endrew F., and two of them were in the unclear, or mixed, category.”).
142. Id. at 453.
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the exercise of judgment by school authorities.” 143 Presumably, this
still means that some proof of this application and exercise of
judgement needs to be presented in order for a court to defer to a
school’s substantive decisions. 144 Some scholars argue this decreases
the amount of deference owed, “mov[ing] away from some of the
constrained interpretations of Rowley’s language concerning defer145
ence and school district expertise.”
The court did reaffirm, however, that the lack of a bright-line
rule regarding what constitutes a FAPE is not “an invitation to the
courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy
for those of the school authorities which they review.”146 The addition of this language cautions against the conclusion that Endrew F.
will lead to a drastic change in how courts review the performance
of schools in creating IEPs. Particularly given the general reluctance of courts to get involved in topics that are gauged to involve
significant expertise in any subject area, in this case education policy, it seems unlikely the courts will require a particularly rigorous
showing of proof from school personnel to justify their decisions.
An avenue that does remain clearly open for holding schools accountable, however, is their compliance with the process requirements of the IDEA. Ironically, this understanding stems from the
Court’s rejection of the District’s proposed standard in Endrew F.,
that the IDEA imposes “only procedural requirements—a checklist
147
of items the IEP must address.” In stating that the IDEA requires
more than procedural compliance in order for a school to demonstrate that it has offered FAPE, the Court implicitly acknowledges
that procedural compliance is still a necessary component of
FAPE. 148 This point is not more thoroughly developed in the opinion because it was not at issue: the parties disagreed on the substance of FAPE, not whether the school had failed, for example, to
act within statutory deadlines or to properly provide Endrew’s fam-

143. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001
(2017).
144. See id. at 1002 (“A reviewing court may fairly expect those authorities to be able to
offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”).
145. Terry Jean Seligmann, Flags on the Play: The Supreme Court Takes the Field to Enforce the
Rights of Students with Disabilities, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 479, 490 (2017).
146. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).
147. Id. at 1000.
148. Id. (“But the procedures are there for a reason, and their focus provides insight
into what it means, for purposes of the FAPE definition, to ‘meet the unique needs’ of a
child with a disability.”).
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ily with notice regarding changes to his IEP.149 Additionally, less
guidance is required from the Supreme Court on this topic because procedural or process compliance is much easier for courts
to evaluate. 150 It can clearly be shown on the record whether a
deadline was met or a statutory obligation was fulfilled.
While Endrew F. brought the issue of special education and outcomes for students with disabilities to the national stage, its amorphous standard and reaffirmation of the deference owed to school
personnel will, standing alone, not be enough to change or improve implementation of the IDEA. Legal reform clarifying Congress’ intent regarding the level of FAPE owed to students with disabilities is needed to supplement the opinion and truly give it force
in the IEP context. Additionally, it is currently unclear to what degree courts need to defer to school personnel regarding the substantive content of IEPs. Courts therefore may be more comfortable focusing on process measures. The strongest avenue for
reform, then, is to create a clear process obligation on schools that
advances the objectives of the Act and the Endrew F. standard and
increases the quality of IEPs in the first instance.
III. AMENDING THE IDEA TO INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THREATS
As already discussed, the IDEA outlines a very clear set of processes to be followed when developing an IEP. One category of
considerations that is not included, however, is threats: interactions between the child and their environment that are out of the
child’s control, but could nevertheless impede their progress toward their goals. The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and
Threats (SWOT) analysis framework, taken from the business
strategy context, provides a useful lens for understanding why incorporating threats into IEPs is important and how it could help
lead to more robust IEPs overall.

149. Id. at 997 (“Endrew’s parents contended that the final IEP proposed by the school
district was not ‘reasonably calculated to enable [Endrew] to receive educational benefits’
and that Endrew had therefore been denied a FAPE.”).
150. Congress has also codified a statutory definition of FAPE in the context of procedural violations, making it easier for courts to determine whether a violation has occurred
or not. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2012).
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A. Background on SWOT Analysis
The SWOT analysis framework is a tool used by businesses and
large organizations to undertake strategic planning. 151 Although its
exact origins are unclear, scholars agree that SWOT was developed
152
sometime between the 1950s and 60s. Large companies, increasingly dominant in the post-World War II landscape, realized that
conscious strategic thinking, rather than simply letting the “invisible hand” guide the market, offered a number of business and
productivity advantages and would increase their ability to make a
153
return on large financial investments. Business schools also began to train managers in strategic thinking tools, including SWOT
154
analysis.

151. Marilyn M. Helms & Judy Nixon, Exploring SWOT Analysis – Where Are We Now?: A
Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade, 3 J. STRATEGIC MGMT. 215, 216 (2010).
152. Id.
153. Pankaj Ghemawat, How Business Strategy Tamed the “Invisible Hand,” HARV. BUS. SCH.
(Jul. 22, 2002), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/how-business-strategy-tamed-the-invisiblehand.
154. See id.
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SWOT analysis starts with a 2 x 2 grid. 155 Internal strengths and
weaknesses of the organization—structure, access to capital, efficiency, core competencies, unique resources—are listed in the top
156
row. External opportunities and threats—customers, competitors, new technologies, and social or political factors—are listed in
157
the bottom row. By using her knowledge not only of her company, but also of the broader landscape of competitors and market
that the company operates in, this framework distills the vast
knowledge a manager has in her head into clear variables, and displays them in a way that hopefully allows her to make connections
between them. For example, explicitly identifying a threat to the
business—a new competitor, for instance—while simultaneously
highlighting internal strengths might identify a function this company does much better than the competitor. The company might
then choose to strategically invest more resources in that function
in order to differentiate itself and protect its market share from the
imminent threat.
The clean approach provided by the SWOT framework for
breaking down what are often complex problems means it has
158
found applications in business and beyond. Indeed, some schol159
ars assert it is used more than “any other strategic planning tool.”
B. Using the SWOT Framework to Highlight a Gap in IEPs
Not only is SWOT used to analyze organizations across a variety
of fields, ranging from for-profit companies to education to
160
161
healthcare, it can also be used for individual analysis. An IEP
can certainly be conceptualized as an individual strategic planning
tool, allowing the IEP team to put on paper a year-long plan for
achieving student success. Comparing the SWOT and IEP approaches to strategic planning, it becomes clear that the existing
structure of an IEP can be neatly mapped to the categories of
SWOT, with one exception—currently, IEPs contain no explicit
consideration of threats. Specifically, the IDEA outlines eight categories of information that must be included in an IEP. These can

155. SWOT
Analysis,
NEWMAN LIBR. BARUCH C. (July 22, 2019, 3:50 PM),
https://guides.newman.baruch.cuny.edu/c.php?g=188239&p=1243104.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Helms & Nixon, supra note 151, at 216.
159. Id. at 217.
160. Id. at 226.
161. Marie Herman, Creating a Personal SWOT Analysis, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MAG. (May
25, 2017), http://executivesecretary.com/creating-a-personal-swot-analysis/.
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all be categorized as either an assessment of an internal strength or
weakness or provision of an external opportunity through services:
IEP REQUIREMENTS:

S

W

Present levels of academic achievement
162
and functional performance
163
Measurable annual goals
Plan for measuring goals, progress
164
monitoring, and reporting
Statement of special education and
related services to be provided 165
Statement of any circumstances under
which the child will not be in the regular
166
classroom
Any accommodations for state or
districtwide testing 167
Date for the beginning of services, as well
as their frequency, location, and
duration 168
Transition planning for students over the
169
age of 16

X

X

X
X

X
X

O

T

X
X

X
X

X

Some of these sections could reasonably be expanded to include
threat analysis, but they are not defined that way in the statute. Rather, the interpretation of what is required to be documented under each of these parts is constrained by the first two sections,
which focus solely on a student’s internal strengths and weaknesses
and setting goals to achieve those. On one hand, this inwardlooking focus of the IDEA makes sense given the overall goal of the
statute: to create an individualized program of study that addresses
the unique needs of a child. The categories as currently defined,
however, miss out on something made clear from the SWOT
framework: when one is trying to meet a goal, external factors can
get in the way. Without a consideration of those external factors,
170
the strategic plan is incomplete.
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2012).
163. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2012).
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (2012).
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (2012).
166. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V) (2012).
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI) (2012).
168. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (2012).
169. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
170. Notably, threats are analyzed and successfully incorporated in a different special
education strategic planning context: the development of functional behavior assessments
(FBAs) and behavior intervention plans (BIPs). This two-step process is not core to the
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The fact that IEPs are not currently structured to include a consideration of threats is a problem for two distinct reasons. First, the
current structure for dealing with threats, or problems that arise
during the school year, is to call an IEP team meeting and revise
the student’s IEP accordingly. 171 Anyone on the team who notices a
172
problem can call a meeting to discuss the issue and get input.
Because this strategy is reactionary, however, there can be a delay
that ends up harming the child. To the extent that the IEP team
can anticipate threats that a child will face, the team can discuss
those points, create a plan of attack in case the threats arise, and
explicitly document steps to address the threats in the IEP. The
school then has at least an interim strategy to put in place immediately while the team is being convened. The current approach is
akin to a corporation calling an emergency board meeting to discuss the threat posed by a competitor after already beginning to
lose market share, rather than when they first knew the competitor
was going to launch a new product. Particularly for parents who
work multiple jobs or are single parents, or schools with a highneeds population and many students served by IEPs, there can be
extensive delay before an IEP meeting even gets scheduled. In the
meantime, the student continues to suffer.
Second, the IDEA’s procedural safeguards are designed to allow
the parent to hold the school accountable only to what is or is not
in writing in the IEP, based on the categories of information outlined in the statute. Challenging a school’s failure to address a
problem is much easier if the potential for a problem is acknowledged at the IEP team meeting, and if clear strategies are agreed
upon to address the problem if it does come up. This more thorough documentation of the meeting of the minds, much as one
would see in a contract negotiation, gives the school a clearer pic-

IDEA in the way that IEPs are, but it is codified in many states as a part of the IEP process.
BIPs are meant specifically to support students with disabilities who exhibit behaviors in the
classroom that affect their ability or their peers’ ability to learn (e.g. aggression or inability
to control speech). Core components of the functional behavior assessment include, in relevant part, “descriptions of the assessment conditions that may reliably predict the occurrence and nonoccurrence of problem behaviors . . . [and] descriptions of the consequence
events that maintain problem behaviors.” These “conditions” and “consequence events,” or
“threats,” are then required to be incorporated into the BIP, which is essentially a supplement to the IEP that offers guidance to the student and the teacher regarding how to manage, control, and approach various behaviors that the student might exhibit in the classroom. Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Intervention
Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 179–186 (2011). Schools are also required to conduct an FBA and implement relevant “behavioral intervention services and
modifications” for most children with disabilities who face disciplinary action. 20 U.S.C.
1415(k)(1)(D) (2012).
171. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
172. See id.
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ture of what they are responsible for doing and gives a parent the
ability to hold them to account if they do not.
C. Amending the IDEA: Adding in an
Explicit Consideration of Threats
The strategic and substantive goals of the IDEA would be better
served if IEP planning teams were required to consider potential
external threats when developing a student’s IEP. This Note proposes an amendment, added to 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i) as a
ninth section of content, requiring IEPs to include a “statement of
any factors affecting the school environment but outside the
child’s control that, based on the experience or insight of any team
member, may impede the child’s progress toward her stated goals,
and a statement of the strategies to be employed in that eventuality.” Schools should have an explicit mandate not just to consider
what they are going to do for a child in terms of academic and behavioral supports and goals, but also what, based on their experience, might derail those efforts (e.g. bullying; changes in school
personnel, resources, or scheduling; a change in the child’s medication, etc.), and how they are going to respond in the event that
one of these circumstances arises.
1. Substantive and Procedural Dimensions of the Amendment
By adding a consideration of threats into IEPs, this amendment
adds a new substantive dimension to the IDEA. This addition
brings the language of the statute closer together with the Supreme Court’s explanation of what it means to provide a FAPE and
be in compliance with the Act. Looking at the plain language of
the Court’s standard, the idea that an educational program must
be “reasonably calculated” implies that imposing some sort of strategic framework on the program development process is at the very
least appropriate, if not required. A “reasonable” approach—one
that is “sensible” and “according to reason”—should not leave out
an entire category of events (threats) that are likely to impact the
173
eventual outcome of the plan. The Supreme Court in Endrew F.
noted that the categories of information listed in this section of the
IDEA do not merely constitute a “checklist” of items for a school to

173.

Reasonable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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tick off. 174 Rather, they “provide insight[] into what it means, for
purposes of the FAPE definition, to ‘meet the unique needs’ of a
child with a disability.” 175 This amendment would add to that insight, providing schools with a stronger understanding of what it
means to provide a FAPE—considering threats as well as opportunities—and providing parents, advocates, and IEP team members
like teachers or therapists with a statutorily defined opportunity to
put on paper any concerns they may not have been able to fit into
any of the previous categories. Provision of FAPE is at the core of
176
many disagreements between parents and schools over IEPs. A
clearer understanding of what it means to provide FAPE and how
to document it in an IEP, therefore, should lead to fewer disputes
between these parties.
However, in keeping with the direction from Endrew F. that
courts not over-involve themselves in substantive decisions at the
school level, 177 this amendment is sufficiently procedural in nature
that courts should not have a difficult time determining whether
the requirement has been met or not. Because the threat assessment is added to a list that already exists within the statutory
framework, it can be considered in the same way the categories in
that list currently are. Courts can ask themselves, are all of the statutorily defined sections present? Did the school officials “bring
their expertise and judgement to bear” when they were developing
178
the IEP? Can the school officials “offer a cogent and responsive
explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably
calculated to enable the child to make progress”? 179 These categories provide guidance for courts when they are asked to determine
whether an IEP was properly constructed in the first instance, a
further indication of whether FAPE has been provided.

174. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000
(2017).
175. Id.
176. A Tennessee study found that 78.6% of state due process hearings over a ten-year
period involved a question of FAPE. Michael B. Shuran & M.D. Roblyer, Legal Challenge:
Characteristics of Special Education Litigation in Tennessee Schools, 96(1) NASSP BULL. 44–66
(2012). See also Schanding et al., supra note 82, at 1.
177. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (“This absence of a bright-line rule, however, should
not be mistaken for ‘an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.’” (quoting Bd. of
Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982))).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1002.

WINTER 2019]

A Strategic Amendment to the IDEA

525

2. How Searching Would a School’s Inquiry Need to be in
Order to Satisfy this New Mandate?
One clear criticism of this reform is that IEP teams do not have
crystal balls—they have no way to know what might happen to a
child, and it would be unfair to hold them accountable for a broad
range of potentialities they have no way of predicting. To this end,
it would be important to write the language of the amendment
with reasonable expectations in mind. The goal of this reform is
not to somehow extract clairvoyance from the IEP team, but rather
to harness the information team members already have that is not
currently making its way into the IEP through any of the required
sections.
For example, if parents are planning on having another child
during the school year, they might be aware that the change in
routine is likely to exacerbate their student’s need for structure in
the classroom. Alerted of this ahead of time, the IEP team could
write into the IEP extra provisions for structure during the day or
make a commitment not to change the student’s schedule unless
absolutely necessary, with these provisions to be used if the student
does indeed react poorly to the change in routine at home. As will
be discussed in Part IV, if a teacher noticed during the previous
school year that the student seemed to be susceptible to bullying
from a particular group of students in a way that was interfering
with their ability to achieve their academic goals, the IEP team
could discuss classroom or behavioral supports to mitigate the impact of that bullying.
One way to achieve this clarity regarding the scope of the
amendment would be for the amendment language to include subsections, or categories, of threats to be considered, along with spe180
cific examples. This would provide a clearer indication of legislative intent as to what sorts of threats are meant to be discussed and
documented by the IEP team. An amendment with subcategories
could be framed as follows:
“a statement of any factors affecting the school environment but outside the child’s control that, based on the experience or insight of any team member, may impede the

180. Several of the other content sections in this part of the Act are outlined in this way.
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2012) (“(II) a statement of measurable annual
goals, including academic and functional goals, designed to . . . (aa) meet the child’s needs
that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and make progress
in the general education curriculum; and (bb) meet each of the child’s other educational
needs that result from the child’s disability.”).
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child’s progress toward her stated goals, including but not
limited to factors such as:
(I)
bullying or harassment from other students;
(II) changes in routine or schedule;
(III) changes in transportation;
(IV) persistent or problematic interactions with staff
or school resource officers; or
(V) difficulties with consistent attendance;
and a statement of the strategies to be employed in
that eventuality.” 181

3. How Does This Help Students Whose IEPs Are
Poorly Written to Begin with?
Another criticism of this proposed reform is that it creates more
work on already-burdened IEP teams, particularly in low-resource
schools. For a student whose IEP is poorly written to begin with,
filled with boilerplate text that is hardly changed from year to year,
adding another box on the form is unlikely on its own to increase
the quality of the document and might even initially add more
confusion into the process. This concern highlights a more fundamental structural concern with the IEP as a tool: in low-resource,
high-needs schools, more significant structural changes regarding
funding and implementation will have to occur in order to realize
182
the full potential of the IEP to serve students with disabilities.
The proposed reform on its own cannot fix that larger problem. It
is likely that in some schools, this reform will have little to no dayto-day effect on students, at least initially.
However, this reform will certainly improve IEPs in schools that
already put the requisite time and effort into IEP planning by
drawing the attention of IEP teams to an issue that is not currently
explicitly documented. In schools that struggle to implement IEPs
with fidelity, this provision will hopefully give advocates and parents another lever for discussion and service provision as they push
their school to do its best. In the long run, these problems cannot
be solved without Congressional and state action to fully fund the
mandate of the IDEA; this reform looks ahead to that future and
hopes to improve the IEP structure in anticipation of that eventuality.

181.
182.

See infra Part IV for more detail on threats that could be included as subcategories.
BLACK, supra note 12, at 470.
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IV. BULLYING OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES:
AN EXAMPLE OF THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF
DOCUMENTING THREATS IN IEPS
In considering the various potential challenges faced by students
with disabilities that this amendment to the IDEA might be able to
capture, bullying stands out. Virtually every state has some kind of
anti-bullying statute on the books, indicating a national acknowl183
edgement that bullying interferes with students’ learning.
Schools, however, can be unprepared, unable, or unwilling to help
184
parents and students address this bullying. Aside from following
any procedures for seeking relief within a school’s administrative
system, the most practical option available to parents under federal
law to seek redress if their child is facing bullying is to write a
185
“Gebser letter” to their school. The purpose of this letter is to put
the school on notice that bullying is occurring, which, under the
standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista
School District, prevents the school from later avoiding liability by
186
arguing that it was not aware anything was wrong. Gebser letters
do not guarantee or mandate any action on the part of the school,
however, and do not redress the imminent potential effects of the
bullying on the child’s education.
While there is a strong case for unaddressed bullying in school
resulting in a per se denial of FAPE, this idea has not been adopted
187
across circuits. Even if a parent is eventually able successfully
claim that bullying resulted in their student being denied FAPE,
the damage has been done—the time that goes into figuring out a
solution and resolving the litigation permanently affects the stu188
dent’s education. The T.K. case demonstrates this problem. The
bullying at issue in that case began during the 2007–2008 school
183. Douglas E. Abrams, Bullying Victimization as a Disability in Public Elementary and Secondary Education, 77 MO. L. REV. 781, 784 (2012).
184. See Jill Barshay, Research Evidence on Bullying Prevention at Odds with What Schools Are
Doing, HECHINGER REP. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://hechingerreport.org/research-evidence-onbullying-prevention-at-odds-with-what-schools-are-doing/.
185. See Discrimination, Harassment, and Bullying 2, EQUIP FOR EQUALITY (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.equipforequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Bullying-Fact-Sheet2.29.16-1.pdf.
186. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 274 (1998).
187. Kathleen Conn, Failure to Discuss Bullying in the IEP Meeting May Violate IDEA, 334
EDUC. L. REP. 45, 48-49 (2016). In T.K. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 810 F.3d 869 (2d
Cir. 2016), the court held that when a school did not include any discussion of bullying in a
student’s IEP, despite her parents raising the issue in meetings more than once and it having a clear impact on her academic performance, this was a procedural violation of the
IDEA. See also Sarah H. Ganley, Bullying and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA): A Framework for Providing Relief to Students with Disabilities, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 305,
317-28 (2016).
188.
See T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 810 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 2016).
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year. Between filing due process appeals, exhausting available administrative remedies, and then finally pursuing the litigation from
a federal district court up to the Second Circuit, relief was not
awarded until 2016.
In the case of the student in T.K., her parents expressed con189
cern more than once that she was facing bullying in school. At
least once, they were told by the school principal that bullying was
190
an “inappropriate topic” for discussion at an IEP meeting. As a
result, strategies to mitigate the threat T.K. was clearly facing never
made it into her IEP, and her parents had to remove her from
school to fix the problem. If there had been an explicit statutory
mandate to discuss the bullying—a threat that at least some individuals in the room were clearly aware she was facing—years of litigation could have been avoided. Acknowledging threats like bullying ahead of time and developing strategies to deal with them
would lead to better outcomes for all parties involved, most of all
for the students meant to be supported by their IEPs in achieving
191
“ambitious” academic and social goals.
In addition to bullying, a variety of other features of the school
environment that could present threats might be addressed in a
student’s IEP:
•
Changes in routine or schedule: Particularly for students on the autism spectrum, changes in routine or
schedule can lead to difficulties in learning and ac192
quiring new skills. These types of stressors could be
planned for when parents or teachers are aware of
them.
•
Transportation: Some students are provided with
transportation as a part of “related services” under the
193
IDEA. Particular traffic patterns or weather-related
challenges might cause predictable disruptions in the
provision of transportation to and from school. IEP
teams could plan for these predictable disruptions by
developing contingency strategies to get the student to
school.
•
School staff: Conflicts with any given staff member in
the school that the student might have revealed to
189. Id. at 873.
190. Id.
191. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000
(2017).
192. Kara Hume, Change Is Good! Supporting Students on the Autism Spectrum When Introducing Novelty, IND. RESOURCE CTR. FOR AUTISM, https://www.iidc.indiana.edu/pages/changeis-good-21-supporting-students-on-the-autism-spectrum-when-introducing-novelty.
193. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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parents or that teachers might have observed could be
discussed and addressed as a threat in the student’s
day-to-day school experience.
•
School resource officers (SROs): Sworn police officers
in schools, or SROs, represent one of the “fastest
194
growing areas of law enforcement,” and many are
195
not trained to work with students with disabilities.
Problematic interactions with an SRO could be anticipated and planned for.
•
Attendance: Students with disabilities are 1.5 times
more likely than their peers to be chronically absent
196
from school. Particular threats in their environments leading to absenteeism could be investigated
and addressed to decrease their impact on the student’s attendance.
What makes a good IEP? Ideally, it meets the relevant legal
standards, but also truly serves as a resource for the student, their
parents, and their school. A key insight from this short consideration of various threats is that the challenges a student with disabilities will face are incredibly individualized. Both the IEP structure
and Endrew F. acknowledge this reality, even if they cannot fully
address it. Different environmental stressors and life events affect
students in different ways. A well-crafted, reasonably calculated IEP
should acknowledge these stressors and should make every effort
to incorporate the widest possible range of information held by
members of the IEP team. Though teams could theoretically incorporate any of the above considerations now, an explicit mandate to consider threats would increase the chances that this kind
of relevant information makes its way into the written IEP.
CONCLUSION
Aside from having pragmatic and procedural benefits for all involved, this reform is in the spirit of the IDEA. The words of the
Act at this time do not explicitly reflect the importance of the IEP

194. Cheryl Corley, Do Police Officers in Schools Really Make them Safer?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Mar. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591753884/do-police-officersin-schools-really-make-them-safer.
195. See Mark Keierleber, Why So Few School Cops Are Trained to Work with Kids, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/whydo-most-school-cops-have-no-student-training-requirements/414286/.
196. Brian A. Jacob & Kelly Lovett, Chronic Absenteeism: An Old Problem in Search of New
Answers, BROOKINGS (July 27, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/chronicabsenteeism-an-old-problem-in-search-of-new-answers/.
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team working together to consider real-world threats that might
impede planning for student achievement. Amending the IDEA
accordingly is in line with Congress’ intent in creating the Act and
will enhance its ability to serve millions of students across the
country for years to come.

